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1 Introduction
Do sellers generate the efficient level of public information regarding their
goods? We contribute to answering this fundamental question by examining
the case of a competitive market with vertically differentiated products. We
do so by considering a canonical model of price competition with vertically
differentiated products (as in Shaked and Sutton, 1982), in which consumers
and firms have identical beliefs regarding the products qualities. Our innova-
tion is to allow firms, before setting their prices, to generate costly, unbiased
signals correlated with the quality of their products, observed publicly by all
consumers and all firms.
For example, a product’s technical specifications may be perfectly known
to all consumers and all firms. However, the consumption utility generated
by this product may depend on harder-to-measure attributes such as its
aesthetic appeal, its ergonomics and ease of use, the presence of unexpected
bugs or defects, both in absolute terms and relative to other products. These
attributes can be (partially) learned via informative public signals: industry
competitions, trade shows, industry classifications, reviews by experts in the
media (examples are Consumer Reports in the US or Which? in the UK),
quality tests and certification by professional agencies (e.g., rating agencies
for financial products, TÜV for industrial goods). These signals are often
commissioned by firms, either individually or via industry bodies tasked with
organizing industry competitions or maintaining classification systems.1
As a preliminary result, we show that under mild assumptions (log con-
cavity of the distribution of consumer’s taste for quality and a sufficiently
high minimum taste for quality) in Shaked and Sutton (1982)’s model a con-
sumer’s equilibrium choice of product quality, low or high, is independent
of the distribution of qualities in the market. Equipped with this result, we
then derive our main proposition: that, for given average taste for quality,
1A case in point are wine classification systems, usually maintained by associations of
vintners. See, for example, the Bordeaux wine classification of 1855, and, more impor-
tantly, its more recent and regularly updated offshoot Cru Bourgeois. Similar systems in
Burgundy, Champagne, Douro, and other regions. While observable variables such as soil
quality of the vineyard and the weather of the vintage determine expected qualities, the
true quality of a fine wine often only realizes after years of storage.
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firms will under- (over-) invest in information generation when the market
share of the leader is high (low). This means that inefficiency in information
generation is linked to the deadweight loss in the pricing equilibrium.
For intuition, note that in the first best allocation all consumers con-
sume the product of the quality leader. Hence, when the market share of
the quality follower is large, there is a substantial deadweight loss in the
pricing equilibrium. This loss strictly increases in the amount of information
generated, because, when new information arrives, the expected quality dis-
tance between leader and follower grows. Firms fail to internalize the impact
of information generation on the subsequent deadweight loss, which implies
that when the deadweight loss is large in equilibrium, firms overinvest in
information generation relative to the social optimum.
Conversely, when few consumers purchase from the quality follower, the
deadweight loss is small and so is its sensitivity to new information. We
show that the social benefit of information generation then exceeds its private
benefit and firms will underinvest in information generation relative to the
social optimum. This underinvestment is most severe in the limit case in
which the quality leader captures the entire market. The reason is that the
quality leader’s profits—and his incentives to generate information—depend
on the marginal valuation of its product, i.e. the willingness to pay of the
least quality-sensitive consumer. The social value of information generation
instead depends on the average consumer’s valuation.2
We also show that public information generates a positive externality
among firms, because drawing any signal increases a firm’s expected profits,
including signals about the opponent’s product. Hence, even if prices are
set competitively, firms can soften competition by cooperating in generating
unbiased, publicly available information about product quality, for example,
by introducing a classification system or an industry-wide competition. Such
coordination decreases aggregate surplus whenever the level of information
generation in the Nash equilibrium already exceeds the social optimum, which
2Interestingly, in the underinvestment case, consumers may benefit from generating
additional information. This paper focuses on firm behavior, see Terstiege and Wasser
(2019) for optimal information generation from the consumers’ perspective.
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provides a novel perspective on the regulation of industry cooperation.
Finally, we extend the model by allowing firms to achieve vertical dif-
ferentiation also via costless quality degradation. It is well known that, ab-
sent information generation, in equilibrium firms will increase the expected
quality distance in the product market by way of quality degradation. The
possibility of generating public information mitigates this problem, because
learning provides an alternative means to generate quality dispersion in the
market. Hence, when quality degradation is a concern, encouraging firms to
cooperate in information generation may be socially desirable, as it prevents
quality degradation.
Related literature.
Our primary goal is to contribute to the literature studying information gen-
eration in competitive settings. We also contrast our results with those in the
literature on information generation in monopoly settings and the literature
on information disclosure.
Information generation. The existing literature studying information
generation in competitive settings has mostly focused on horizontal com-
petition (see, in particular, Anderson and Renault, 2000, 2009, Levin, Peck,
and Ye, 2009). Similar to our paper, also with horizontal competition, in-
creasing distance between quality levels via information generation increases
firms market power. However, the welfare implications differ markedly be-
tween horizontal and vertical competition.3
The small literature on information generation with vertical differentia-
tion tends to rely on very specific informational environments. For instance,
Bouton and Kirchsteiger (2015) examine the role of reliable rankings of sell-
ers and show that their presence can reduce consumers’ welfare. Bergemann
3There is, of course, the classical paradox that by construction fully revealing market
equilibrium prices will not provide incentives for costly information generation (Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1980), which has been resolved by allowing agents to take into account the
effect of their actions on prices and beliefs of other agents (Milgrom, 1981; Verrecchia,
1982).
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and Välimäki (2000) consider a dynamic setting, in which information is
generated through repeated purchases, and find that information generation
increases firms’ market power and may reduce social welfare. By contrast we
consider a generic form of information generation (i.e., any unbiased signal
correlated with the distribution of quality), examine incentives for over- or
underinvestment in information, as well as the role of coordination in infor-
mation generation.
Information generation has also been studied in monopoly settings. E.g.,
Ottaviani and Prat (2001) find that a monopolist always benefits from gener-
ating and disclosing signals that are affiliated to the buyer’s valuation. Other
studies have examined the incentives to generate public information in auc-
tions (e.g. the seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Closer to our
model, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) study an auction, in which one side of
the market (the firm) generates information related to the other side of the
market (the buyers’ valuations). They argue that the amount of information
generated by the firm will fall short of the social optimum, because infor-
mation increases the dispersion in buyers’ evaluations and information rents.
Roesler and Szentes (2017) examine a related issue, identifying the optimal
information environment from the buyers’ point of the view. Out setup dif-
fers in the presence of a second firm/seller, which affects the incentive to
generate information: both over- and under-provision of information can be
outcome, depending on the market share of the quality leader.
Finally, the literature has studied models, in which firms generate pri-
vate information, that is, signals that are informative relative to each con-
sumer’s idiosyncratic preferences (for example, Lewis and Sappington, 1994,
Moscarini and Ottaviani, 2001, Johnson and Myatt, 2006). We study public
information instead, which is about the quality of the goods sold in the mar-
ket, where “quality” refers to the attributes of a product that are valued by
all consumers. Hence, all consumers prefer higher quality to lower quality,
but may trade off quality and price differently.4
4Because the taste for quality of each consumer is constant, but information generation
affects the expected quality, in our setting new information always proportionally shifts
the consumer’s willingness to pay.
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Information disclosure A related problem is that of a privately informed
firm deciding how much information to disclose to consumers. To the best
of our knowledge, Meurer and Stahl (1994) are the first to point out that
information disclosure by one firm generates a positive externality on com-
peting firms. However, they only consider horizontal competition and a very
specific information structure (i.e., informative advertising).5
More closely related to our work is Board (2009) studying information
disclosure by firms under vertical competition. In his setup there are equi-
libria in which disclosure of information by firms may be partial, and hence
a policy forcing disclosure is socially desirable. By contrast, our setup yields
over-provision of information when the market share of the quality follower
is high.6 Related is also Jovanovic (1982), showing that a monopolist will
disclose too much information to consumers relative to the social optimum,
whereas in our setup a monopolist will under-invest in information.
In the remainder of the paper we first present the model. Then in Section
3 we derive the equilibrium in the pricing game for given expected qualities.
In Section 4 we solve the full game, in which firms can invest to generate
information before setting prices. Section 5 adds a stage to the game, in which
each firm can degrade its product at no cost. The last section concludes. All
mathematical derivations missing from the text are in the appendix.
2 Model
Our starting point is the canonical model of a duopoly with vertically dif-
ferentiated products (see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, Shaked and Sutton,
1982, and Chapter 7 of Tirole, 1988’s textbook). The market consists of 2
firms and a mass 1 of buyers. Each firm produces a good of quality si ∈ [s, s]
5See also Vives (1999), chapter 8, discussing incentives of firms to share (but not
generate) private information in different models of oligopolistic competition. Related to
our findings, both Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Vives (1999) argue that firms may benefit
from organizing a trade association to gather information from their members and then
share it.
6Clearly, an interesting extention is to consider both the choice of information genera-
tion and the subsequent choice of information disclosure. We briefly discuss such extension
in our conclusions.
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for i ∈ {1, 2}. A buyer’s utility is given by
U =
θsi − pi if good i is purchased0 in case of no purchase,
where pi is the price of the good produced and θ ∈ R+ is an i.i.d. taste
parameter with cumulative distribution function F (x) = pr(θ ≤ x) that is
continuous, differentiable, and has a continuous first derivative. We assume
that the support of θ has a minimum θ (so that F (x) = 0 for all x ≤ θ), but
may or may not have a maximum. If a maximum exists, we call it θ > θ,
otherwise we write θ =∞.
Each firm has zero marginal cost of production, so that profit is given by
price times quantity sold.
Information and Learning
We depart from the canonical model by assuming that the quality levels si
are unknown to both buyers and firms, who have common ex-ante beliefs
about si. Call qi = E[si] the initial expected quality of firm i’s product, and
assume, without loss of generality, that q1 ≥ q2.
Firm i can generate information by paying a cost k and drawing a signal
σi, which is informative with respect to si and may be informative with
respect to s−i as well.
7 We allow for any possible correlation between any σ1
and σ2. Information generated is public: all market participants receive the
signal and update their belief about quality. We adopt the convention that
σi = ∅, if firm i does not generate information. We therefore write σ = (∅, ∅)
if no firm generates information, σ = (∅, σi) when firm i ∈ {1, 2} generates
information but not firm −i, and σ = (σ1, σ2) when both firms generate
7We abstract away from the choice of precision of the signal (as in the Bayesian per-
suasion literature, see in particular Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016) as well as from the
possibility of signal jamming. We will show below that both firms’ expected profits in-
crease in the precision of both signals. Hence, firms have no incentive to jam each other’s
signal, and, for given cost of drawing a signal, firms prefer the most precise signal available.
Hence, our results carry over to such a case. However, if signals of different precision differ
in their cost, firms will face a trade off. This trade off depends crucially on the details of
the cost function, and we prefer to leave this extension for future research.
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information.
Denote the ex-post expected quality by q̂i, that is, the expected quality of
firm i given a specific realization of σ. Note that by iterating expectations
E [q̂i|σ] = qi for any signal configuration σ (where the expectation is taken
over the possible realizations of σ). This means that ex ante, before any
signal is drawn, the expected ex-post quality is equal to the initial expected
quality.
Timing
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows.
1. Given the initial beliefs about qualities, firms simultaneously decide
whether to acquire information at cost k, yielding a vector of signals σ.
2. Realizations of signals are publicly revealed, leading to a revision of the
beliefs about the products’ qualities and to q̂1, q̂2.
3. Firms announce prices simultaneously. Consumers decide if and from
whom to buy and consume. Payoffs are realized.
Solution Concept
To derive the outcome of the game described above we employ a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of signal generation choices σ1 and σ2 and price
choices p1 and p2 depending on the signals.
Assumptions
We conclude the description of the model by introducing some restrictions
on the distribution of the taste parameter θ. These restrictions guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the pricing
game (stage 4 in the timeline above), as we will show.
Assumption 1 (Log-concavity). The density f(θ) is log-concave.
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This assumption comes with only a very modest loss of generality, as log-
concavity is satisfied by a host of widely used distributions. Nonetheless, it
puts some useful structure on F (θ) and f(θ). For example, log concavity
implies that f(θ) is unimodal (see e.g. Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev, 1988).
Hence, f(θ) is strictly positive for θ ∈ (θ, θ) (remember that if there is no
upper bound, we write θ = ∞). Furthermore, log concavity of f(θ) ensures
that both F (θ) and 1−F (θ) are log-concave (see Prékopa, 1973 and Bagnoli
and Bergstrom, 2005). This, in turns, implies that F (θ)/f(θ) increases,
(1−F (θ))/f(θ) decreases, and (1−2F (θ))/f(θ) also decreases, all facts that
we will use extensively in our derivations.
Finally, we assume that there is enough potential revenue in the left tail
of the taste distribution, in the sense that θ is sufficiently high and the taste
distribution has enough mass at or near θ.
Assumption 2 (Covered Market). Either θ · f(θ) > 1, or
θ ·m ≥ s− s
s
, (A2)




Note that, because of log-concavity, 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
is strictly decreasing and hence
θ∗ exists and is unique as long as f(θ)θ ≤ 1.
Condition (A2) is a generalization of the standard covered market condi-
tion.8 As we will show, it guarantees that equilibrium prices are such that
all consumers prefer to purchase from one of the firms to not purchasing.9
Indeed, any distribution that is bounded below with f(θ) > 0 satisfies (A2),
if appropriately scaled up. This is because increasing θ decreases θ∗− θ and,
8For example, in Chapter 7 of Tirole (1988)’s textbook, the taste parameter is dis-
tributed uniformly with θ − θ = 1, and the model is solved assuming the covered market
condition |q̂1−q̂2|max{q̂1,q̂2} ≤ θ. Condition (A2) is a generalization of this condition, because
it applies to all possible distributions of the taste parameter, and to all possible quality
levels (in Tirole, 1988 the quality levels are given exogenously).
9To the best of our knowledge, (1)-(2) are the weakest conditions existing in the litera-
ture guaranteeing existence, uniqueness and full analytical characterization of the pricing
equilibrium with covered market. Studies examining the non covered-market case (Moor-
thy, 1988, Choi and Shin, 1992) or not imposing ex-ante whether the market will be covered
(Wauthy, 1996) restrict their attention to uniform taste distributions.
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therefore, (weakly) increases m. If the new θ is sufficiently large relative
to the maximum possible dispersion in quality s − s, then Condition (A2)
will hold. Since a truncation of a log-concave distribution is also log-concave
(Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005, Theorem 7), any log-concave distribution that
is unbounded below or bounded below but with mass equal to zero at the
lower bound satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, if appropriately truncated.
3 The Pricing Game
Consider a given realization of the signal vector σ. If this realization is such
that q̂1 = q̂2, then the two firms compete á la Bertrand and set equilibrium
prices p1 = p2 = 0. All consumers purchase from one of the two firms, and are
indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 or 2. If instead q̂1 6= q̂2, the two
firms may charge positive prices. Since information generation may reverse
the initial quality ranking of firms, we will refer to the quality leader by L
and the follower by F , so that q̂L ≡ max{q̂1, q̂2} > q̂F ≡ min{q̂1, q̂2}.
Denote a firm i’s posted price by pi. The demand for goods can be char-
acterized by two thresholds. The first threshold X is given by the consumer
who is indifferent between purchasing from either firm, if there is such a














The second threshold Y is given by the consumer who is indifferent between
the lower quality firm F and not consuming, if there is such a consumer, and















These thresholds can be shown to have some useful properties, using that
the quality leader can always out-price the follower.
Lemma 1. In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
- A positive measure of consumers purchase from the quality leader: Y ≤
X < θ.
- If not all consumers purchase from the quality leader (X > θ), then
there is positive demand for the quality follower (X > Y ≥ θ).
Hence, in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium the demand for good L is
1 − F (X) and the demand for good F is F (X) − F (Y ).10 Profits are given
by:
πL(pL, pF ) = pL · (1− F (X)) and πF (pL, pF ) = pF · (F (X)− F (Y )).
Given this, we can derive the two best responses:
Lemma 2. The quality leader’s best response is




(q̂L − q̂F ), θ(q̂L − q̂F ) + pF
}
,
which is a continuous function. The quality follower’s best response is
pF (pL) =
[0,+∞) if pL ≤ θ(q̂L − q̂F )min{F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F ), θq̂F
}
otherwise.
which is a upper-hemicontinuous, compact valued, convex correspondence.
The proof of the Lemma relies on Assumption 1 to establish existence
and uniqueness of the best responses. In addition, Assumption 2 implies
that the market is covered: for every pL the follower’s optimal price is such
that Y = θ.
10From now on we focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria, even when we do not
explicitly mention this.
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A Nash equilibrium is a pair p∗ such that pi(p−i(p
∗
i )) = p
∗
i for i = L, F .
Depending on the distribution of the taste parameter θ, this equilibrium can
be effectively a monopoly, by which we mean that the market is supplied by
a unique seller, or a duopoly, in which both sellers supply some customers.
The following proposition gives sharp conditions on the type distribution for
either case.
Proposition 1 (Market Equilibrium Outcome).
(i) If 1 ≤ θ · f(θ), then in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium X∗ =
Y ∗ = θ, i.e. the quality leader supplies the entire market, and prices are
p∗F = 0 and p
∗
L = θ(q̂L − q̂F ).
(ii) If instead 1 > θ ·f(θ), then in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium





Equilibrium prices are p∗L =
1−F (X∗)
f(X∗)




To establish point (ii) of the Proposition, we first prove that Assumption 2
implies that the follower’s profit maximization problem must have an interior
solution in equilibrium. Knowing this, we then use Assumption 1 to show
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Hence, θ · f(θ) determines whether in the market outcome the quality
leader supplies the whole market, or both firms share the market. If θ ·f(θ) ≥
1 (monopoly) profits are given by
πL = θ(q̂L − q̂F ) and πF = 0,




(q̂L − q̂F ) and πF =
(F (X∗))2
f(X∗)
(q̂L − q̂F ).
Note also that the cutoff X∗, separating consumers buying from L from those
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buying from F , cannot be greater than the median by construction. Hence,
the quality leader’s market share is greater than one half.
Perhaps surprisingly, in equilibrium the demand faced by leader and fol-
lower does not depend on the expected qualities q̂L and q̂F . This is because
under log-concavity both firms’ best responses are proportional to the ex-
pected quality distance q̂L − q̂F , and therefore the equilibrium distribution
of market shares is independent of that distance. Thus the demand faced
by leader and follower depends only on the taste distribution F (θ), which
determines the cutoff X∗. This fact will be very convenient, since it implies
that the signal realizations, and thus also the signal configurations, only af-
fect the identity of quality leader and follower and their market prices, but
not demand.
To provide some illustration for Proposition 1 note that if the taste θ
follows a Pareto then θ · f(θ) ≥ 1 holds and one firm will capture the market
if and only if E(θ) is finite. If the taste distribution is uniform instead, then
the quality leader supplies the entire market if θ ≤ 2θ, otherwise there is
a duopoly with X∗ = θ+θ
3
. Which case will occur depends mainly on two
intuitive effects. First, fixing either θ or θ, as θ − θ increases (and with
it the variance of the distribution) the duopoly becomes more likely. This
is because the quality leader will find it less profitable to attract the least
quality sensitive consumers by lowering the price, thus leaving demand for
the follower. By contrast, holding the range of the support θ − θ constant,
an equal increase in both θ and θ makes it more likely that the quality leader
corners the market. This is because the incentive of the quality leader to sell
to the least quality-sensitive consumer increases in her quality sensitivity.
4 Information generation
Equipped with the properties of the pricing equilibrium we are now in a
position to examine the firms’ choices of information generation. Depending
on the properties of the type distribution, either the quality leader will corner
the market (monopoly case) or both firms will supply some consumers. In
the following we consider each case separately.
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4.1 Case 1: Monopoly (1 ≤ θf(θ))
We start by considering the case 1 ≤ θf(θ), in which the quality leader
covers the entire market. Since all consumers consume the good that has
higher expected quality, the pricing equilibrium is efficient.
Social value of information generation. Given the expected qualities
q̂1 and q̂2 the social welfare is given by:
11
S(q̂1, q̂2) = max{q̂1, q̂2}E[θ] .
Note that, by the law of iterated expectation, the two expected qualities
are independent from σ. This implies that if no realization of the signal
can reverse the quality ranking (so that firm 1 will be the leader for sure),
then the expected social welfare is the same with or without information
generation. If instead it is possible to reverse quality ranking, then by a
straightforward application of the Jensen’s inequality, social welfare is higher
when new information is expected to arrive. For an intuition, suppose that a
signal about the leader’s quality is drawn. If the leader’s quality is revealed to
be better than expected, aggregate welfare will increase. If it is instead worse
than expected, then aggregate welfare will decrease. The decrease in welfare
is, however, bounded below by the quality of the ex-ante quality follower.
This makes information generation about the quality leader socially beneficial
in expectation whenever the quality follower may become the quality leader.
The case of the follower is analogous.
The next lemma shows that this logic is remarkably general, extending
for instance to the cases when each signal is informative of the other product
as well, and when signals are correlated.
Lemma 3. For any two signal configurations σ′ and σ′′, the social benefit
generated from moving from σ′ to σ′′ is given by
E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′′]− E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′] = E[θ] (∆(σ′′, q1, q2)−∆(σ′, q1, q2)) ,
11We assume throughout the paper that the investment in information generation k by
itself is not socially valuable.
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where
∆(σ, q1, q2) ≡ pr{q̂2 ≥ q̂1|σ}E[q̂2 − q̂1|q̂2 ≥ q̂1, σ], (2)
is the expected quality gain.
The above lemma is more easily understood by considering the case σ′ = ∅
but σ′′ 6= ∅, that is, in case in which we move from no information generation
to some information generation. As expected, from a social point of view,
information generation is beneficial if and only if the quality ranking reverses
for some realizations of the signal. If positive, the benefit of information gen-
eration increases with the expected quality gain ∆(σ, q1, q2), which depends
both on the signal σ, but also on the quality distribution. Hence, more in-
formative signals leading to more dispersed posteriors have higher expected
quality gains. Similarly, for given σ 6= (∅, ∅) the expected quality gain in-
creases as the priors q1 and q2 get closer. Note also that ∆(σ, q1, q2) depends
only on the expected posterior quality distribution, but not on which firm
draws a signal. Hence, if firms have access to the same signal technology,
so that σ1 and σ2 induce the same posterior distribution given initial qual-
ity, then the social values of generating information on firm 1’s and firm 2’s
products are identical.
The lemma also allows to compare social welfare under two different signal
configurations σ′ 6= ∅, σ′′ 6= ∅. In this case, an important observation is that
the expected quality gain increases with the number of signals, that is:
∆((∅, ∅), q1, q2) ≤ ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≤ ∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2). for i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
This is because more information (in the form of two signals rather than
one) increases the dispersion in the distribution of the posterior.12 Hence,
expected social welfare is (weakly) monotone in the number of signals drawn.
12To see this, suppose that two signals are drawn sequentially starting with σ1. The
derivation above implies that given a realization of σ1 drawing σ2 is always weakly bene-
ficial, strictly so if the ranking given the realization of σ1 changes for some realizations of
σ2. Hence, in expectation (i.e., before drawing σ1) information generation by both firms
generates weakly greater social welfare (excluding the signal cost) than by only one firm.
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2k if σ = (σ1, σ2),
k if σ = (∅, σi) for i ∈ {1, 2},
0 if σ = (∅, ∅).
Whether it is optimal to learn about only the quality leader, only the quality
follower, or both will depend on the two expected qualities, on the two signals,
and on the cost parameter k.
Private value of information generation. Given the outcome of the
pricing game in Proposition 1 the firms’ profits are
πi(q̂i, q̂−i) =
θ|q̂i − q̂−i| if q̂i > q̂−i0 otherwise,
which increase in the distance between quality levels, strictly so for the qual-
ity leader. Firms’ profits can be more easily compared with social welfare by
rewriting them as:




The above expression makes it clear that the monopolist fails to capture the
entire social surplus for two reasons. The first one is that consumers could
purchase from the quality follower, which implies that all consumers must
enjoy positive surplus (captured by the second part of the above expression).
The second reason is that the monopolist cannot price discriminate, and
hence consumers with higher willingness to pay must enjoy higher surplus
(captured by the first part of the above expression).
When it comes to information generation, however, the first reason is
irrelevant because, as already discussed, unbiased signals do not affect the
expected quality of the followers. The second reason instead plays a central
role, because it implies that information generation increases the monopo-
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list’s profits, but by less than social welfare. The following proposition shows
this formally (its proof is straightforward and is omitted).
Proposition 2. Suppose there is a monopoly (i.e., 1 ≤ θf(θ)). Then for any
two signal configurations σ′ and σ′′ a firm i’s gain in payoffs from moving
from σ′ to σ′′ is given by
E[πi(q̂i, q̂−i)|σ′′]− E[πi(q̂i, q̂−i)|σ′]= θ (∆(σ′′, q1, q2)−∆(σ′, q1, q2)) , (4)
and is proportional to the gain in social welfare with a factor θ/E[θ] < 1.
Note that by (3) the benefit will be non-negative, if σ′′ contains strictly
more signals than under σ′. The proposition therefore confirms that the pri-
vate returns to information generation are lower than the social returns, for
any increase in the number of signals drawn and given any signal configura-
tion. As a side comment, note that this implies that information generation
increases consumer surplus, because social welfare is the sum of profits and
consumer surplus.
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium A firm’s optimal choice of whether
to acquire a signal, and thus the outcome of the two stage game, will depend
on whether the expected increase in profits computed above outweighs the
investment cost k. That is, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
information generation cum pricing game will depend on the quality distri-
bution q1 and q2, the signal technology, and the investment cost k. We list
the pure strategy equilibria below:
• If k > θ (∆(σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) and θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≥ k
then there is an equilibrium in which only firm i ∈ {1, 2} generates
information. There are two equilibria (each corresponding to a different
firm generating information), if these inequalities hold for both i = 1
and i = 2.
• if k ≤ θ (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) and θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≥
k for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, then there is a unique equilibrium in which
both firms generate information.
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• if k ≤ θ (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)), but θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≤
k for both i = 1, 2, then there are multiple equilibria: one in which
no firm generates information, and one in which both firms generate
information.
• Otherwise, there is no information generation in equilibrium.
Therefore multiple equilibria are possible in two cases. First, if it is bene-
ficial for each firm to generate information individually but not jointly, then
there could be two equilibria depending on which firm generates information.
Second, if the expected quality gain ∆(σ, q1, q2) increases in the number of
signals drawn, then information generation choices will be strategic comple-
ments. An interesting case occurs when individual information generation is
not profitable, but joint information generation is. This will be the case, for
instance, when drawing one signal cannot perturb the posterior quality distri-
bution sufficiently to reverse the quality ranking, but drawing two signals can
(so that ∆((∅, σ1), q1, q2) = ∆((∅, σ2), q1, q2) = 0, but ∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2) > 0).
If the cost k is sufficiently small, this case would produce a familiar co-
ordination failure: an equilibrium without information generation, Pareto
dominated by another equilibrium, in which both firms acquire information.
In what follows, if there are multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked,
we will always focus on the Pareto-preferred one.
Which of the different cases will emerge depends not only on the signal
structure, but also on the distance in ex-ante expected qualities |q1 − q2|. If,
for given signals, this distance is sufficiently small, information generation by
at least one firm is more likely in equilibrium. For intermediate |q1−q2|, there
may be multiple equilibria, in which either both firms generate information
or neither does; the former equilibrium Pareto dominates the latter. If the
distance is sufficiently large, neither firm will acquire any signal.
The characterization of the Nash Equilibrium and Proposition 2 imply the
following proposition, derived in the appendix, stating that the equilibrium
level of information generation is inefficiently low.
Proposition 3. Suppose 1 ≤ θf(θ), i.e. there is a monopoly.
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(i) There are values of k for which the number of signal drawn in equilib-
rium is strictly lower than socially optimal. For all other values of k
the efficient number of signals is drawn.13
(ii) Consider any two distributions of the taste parameter F (θ) and F ′(θ)
such that either they have equal mean but different lower bounds θ > θ′,
or they have equal lower bounds but F (θ) has lower mean than F ′(θ).
The set of k for which there is an inefficient equilibrium under F ′(θ)
contains the set of k for which there is an inefficient equilibrium under
F (θ).
Hence, firms are more likely to draw fewer signals in equilibrium than
efficient if the difference between private benefit (as measured by θ) and
social benefit (as measured by E(θ)) of information generation is large.
Coordination in information generation. An implication of Proposi-
tion 4 is that drawing a given signal benefits both firms in the same way, and
hence there is a positive externality in information generation across firms.
It follows that firms may coordinate their choice of information generation
via, for example, an industry body.14
When firms can coordinate their information generation, they will choose
a signal configuration that maximizes joint profits. By the previous deriva-
tions, the joint benefit of information generation by firm i is:
2θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2),
and the joint benefit of information generation by both firms is
2θ∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2).
Because information generation by one firm imposes a positive externality
13Note that for some k there could be coordination failure: there are multiple Nash
equilibria, one with each firm drawing a signal, but not the other. One of these equilibria
is inefficient, because the firm with the less informative signal generates information.
14As already noted, industry bodies are often responsible for creating and maintaining
public information generation mechanisms such as classifications and competitions.
19
on the other firm, the firms’ joint benefit from information generation is larger
than each firm’s individual benefit. Therefore there are cost parameters k, for
which no firm generates information in any equilibrium described above, but
information generation by one or both firms will occur when firms jointly
decide on information generation and share its cost. Similarly, for some
level of k only one firm generates information in equilibrium, and both firms
generate information when they can coordinate.
This increase in information generation will be socially beneficial, if the
joint benefit of information generation is less than its social benefit, that
is, when 2θ ≤ E[θ]. In this case there is underinvestment in information
generation, both with and without coordination, but the underinvestment
will be less severe when firms can coordinate.15 These observations yield the
following corollary to our results above.
Corollary 1. Firms that coordinate their choice of information generation
generate more information than is generated by individual choices in the Nash
equilibrium. If 2θ ≤ E[θ], coordination increases social welfare and consumer
surplus.
4.2 Case 2: Duopoly (1 > θf(θ))
Turn now to the case of a duopoly, i.e., 1 > θf(θ) and thus both firms sell
to some consumers, jointly covering the market.
Social benefit of information generation. In contrast to above case,
now the pricing game has an inefficient outcome. In the pricing equilibrium,
the social welfare is given by:
S(q̂1, q̂2) = q̂L
∫ θ
X∗




= max{q̂1, q̂2}(1−F (X∗))E[θ|θ>X∗]+min{q̂1, q̂2}F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]
= max{q̂1, q̂2}E[θ]− |q̂1 − q̂2|F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]. (5)
15When 2θ > E[θ], firms coordination may lead to overinvestment in information gen-
eration, and may reduce social welfare. We discuss more in details this possibility in the
next subsection.
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The first part of this expression is the first-best social welfare, resulting from
all consumers consuming the high quality good. The second part is the
deadweight loss generated by positive demand for the lower quality good.
Information generation therefore has two competing effects on social wel-
fare. Similar to the monopoly case above, drawing a signal increases the
expected highest quality in the market, which increases social welfare. In
contrast to the monopoly case above, information generation also increases
the expected quality distance, which in turn increases the deadweight loss,
too. The strength of this second effect depends on the market share of the
quality follower (i.e., on F (X∗)) and on the average taste for quality of the
consumers purchasing the low-quality good (i.e., E[θ|θ < X∗]). Both quan-
tities strictly increase in X∗, which is therefore a sufficient statistics for the
social cost of information generation. The following lemma states the social
benefit of information generation.
Lemma 4. For any two signal configurations σ′ and σ′′, the social benefit
generated from moving from σ′ to σ′′ is given by
E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′′]−E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′] = (E[θ]−2F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗]) (∆(σ′′, q1, q2)−∆(σ′, q1, q2)) ,
Recall that, by definition of X∗, the majority of consumers purchase the
high quality good (F (X∗) < 1/2), which implies:16
E[θ]− 2F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗] > E[θ]− E[θ|θ < X∗] > 0.
Hence, the positive effect of information generation dominates: moving from
fewer signals to more signals always increases social welfare, strictly so when
increasing the number of signals strictly increases the expected quality gain.
16Recall also that in any Nash equilibrium of the pricing game the quality leader faces
strictly positive demand and therefore X∗ < θ.
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Private benefit of information generation. To compare private and
social returns, recall the firms’ profits:




if q̂i ≥ q̂−i
F (X∗)2
f(X∗)
if q̂i ≤ q̂−i.
(6)
Both firms’ profits linearly increase in the distance between quality levels,
but because F (X∗) < 1
2
this increase is steeper for the quality leader.
Compared with the monopoly case, now the follower’s profits are positive
and increasing in the distance with the leader. The next proposition shows
that, as a consequence, the private benefit of information generation is here
larger than in the monopoly case. Together with the fact that the social
value of information generation is here lower than in the monopoly case, this
implies that the private value of information may exceed its social value.
Proposition 4. Suppose there is a duopoly (i.e., 1 > θf(θ)). Then for any
two signal configurations σ′ and σ′′ a firm i’s gain in payoffs from moving







(∆(σ′′, q1, q2)−∆(σ′, q1, q2)) ,
(7)
and is proportional to the gain in social welfare with a factor
X∗ + 2F (X
∗)2
f(X∗)
E[θ]− 2F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗]
.
As in the case above the benefit will be non-negative, if σ′′ contains strictly
more signals than σ′. Indeed, Proposition 4 is the duopoly version of Propo-
sition 2 and differs exclusively in that the factor of proportionality between
private and social returns of information generation may be below or above
unity, depending on X∗. The following corollary states the implied condition
for overinvestment.
Corollary 2. Each firm’s private benefit from generating information is
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strictly higher than its social benefit if, and only if:
F (X∗)2
f(X∗)
+ F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗] > 1
2
(E[θ]−X∗). (8)
Note that condition (8) reduces to θ > E[θ], when there is a monopoly
(i.e., 1 ≤ θf(θ) and thus X∗ = θ), so that no qualifier is needed. Indeed,
the LHS of (8) strictly increases in the threshold consumer X∗, while the
RHS of (8) is strictly decreasing in X∗. Hence, if X∗ is sufficiently high (for
example, close to the mean of the distribution of the taste parameter), then a
firm’s private benefit from acquiring a signal is higher than its social benefit.
The reverse holds if X∗ is sufficiently low (for example, close to the marginal
consumer θ).
The next proposition derives conditions under which too few or too many
signals are drawn in equilibrium (relative to the social optimum). Its proof
contains the derivation of the subgame perfect equilibria of the information
generation and pricing game (which is analogous to the monopoly case).
Proposition 5. Suppose 1 > θf(θ), i.e. there is a duopoly
(i) If Condition (8) holds there are values of k for which the number of sig-
nal drawn in equilibrium is strictly greater than socially optimal. For all
other values of k the efficient number of signals is drawn. If condition
(8) does not hold, then Proposition 3 applies.17
(ii) Consider any two distributions of the taste parameter F (θ) and F ′(θ)
such that either they have equal mean but different X∗′ > X∗, or they
have equal X∗′ = X∗ but F (θ) has lower mean than F ′(θ). If Condition
(8) holds at both F (θ) and F ′(θ), then the set of k for which there is an
inefficient equilibrium under F ′(θ) contains the set of k for which there
is an inefficient equilibrium under F (θ). If Condition (8) is violated at
both F (θ) and F ′(θ), then the set of k for which there is an inefficient
equilibrium under F ′(θ) is contained in the set of k for which there is
an inefficient equilibrium under F (θ).
17Also here, for some k there could be coordination failure: there are multiple Nash
equilibria, one with each firm drawing a signal, but not the other. One of these equilibria




Figure 1: Left-tail spread from a uniform distribution. Note that the two
shaded areas are equal.
Note that, again, if Condition (8) holds the difference between private
benefit (as measured by
(




) and social benefit (as measured
by (E[θ]− 2F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗])) of information generation increases in X∗
and decreases in E[θ]. Hence, if Condition (8) holds then inefficiencies are
more likely in equilibrium the higher is X∗ and the lower is E[θ]. Similarly,
if Condition (8) is violated, the difference between private benefit and social
benefit of information generation decreases in X∗ and increases in E[θ], which
implies that inefficiencies are more likely in equilibrium the lower is X∗ and
the higher is E[θ].
With respect to specific distributions, for a uniform distribution both E[θ]
and X∗ increase with θ and decrease with θ. Hence, point (ii) of the above
proposition is mute when θ or θ change. For other distributions, such as the
truncated normal distribution, point (ii) has a bite: one can change E(θ)
independently from X∗ by modifying the parameters of the distribution.
In general, starting from any log-concave distribution for which (A2)
holds strictly, one can decrease its lower bound θ, while holding constant
E[θ|θ > X∗], f(X∗) and F (X∗) and maintaining log-concavity. We call this
modification a left-tail spread. The new distribution will still satisfy (A2).
Figure 1 shows an example.
Clearly, performing such spread does not affect X∗. It does however de-
crease E(θ|θ < X∗), and, as a consequence, E(θ). It follows that a left-tail
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spread increases the difference between private and social benefit of infor-
mation generation. By point (ii) of the above proposition, if Condition (8)
holds such spread makes inefficiencies in the information generation stage
more likely. If Condition (8) is violated such spread makes inefficiencies in
the information generation stage less likely.
A final observation is that making such spread always reduces the dead-
weight loss in the pricing equilibrium. There is therefore an interesting con-
nection between the inefficiencies in the pricing equilibrium and the ineffi-
ciency in the information generation stage. First, the size of the deadweight
loss determines whether firms under- or over-invest in information gener-
ation. This is because reducing the deadweight loss via a left-tail spread
makes if more likely that (8) is violated and therefore firms underinvest in
information generation. On the other hand, reducing the deadweight loss
via a (negative) left-tail spread makes if more likely that (8) holds and firms
overinvest in information generation.
Second, this implies that the relationship between inefficiencies in the
pricing stage and inefficiencies in the information-generation stage is non-
monotonic. Starting from low deadweight loss (so that (8) is violated), as
the deadweight loss increases the set of k for which there is under investment
in information generation progressively shrinks to zero. As the deadweight
loss increases further, condition (8) holds and the set of k for which there
over investment in information generation expands.
We summarize the above observations in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Take any two distributions F (θ) and F ′(θ) that satisfy As-
sumptions 1 and 2 and have the same E[θ|θ > X∗] and the same X∗. Suppose
F (θ) has a higher deaweight loss than F ′(θ).
• If there is overinvestment in information generation under F ′(θ), then
there is overinvestment in information generation under F (θ) as well.
The inefficiencies in the information generation stage are more severe
under F (θ) than under F ′(θ).
• If there is underinvestment in information generation under F (θ), there
is underinvestment in information generation under F ′(θ) as well. The
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inefficiencies in the information generation stage are more severe under
F ′(θ) than under F (θ).
Coordination in information generation. As in the case of a monopoly,
information generation by one firm imposes a positive externality on the
other firm, because of (7). Hence, the firms’ joint benefit of information
generation exceeds each firm’s private benefit. Allowing firms to coordinate
in information generation can thus only increase the number of signals drawn,
which will increase firms’ joint profits. If condition (8) holds, the number of
signals drawn in a Nash equilibrium is already higher than socially optimal,
and thus coordination decreases social surplus. This observation implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. If (8) holds, then coordination in information generation de-
creases aggregate welfare and consumer surplus.
If instead (8) does not hold, then similarly to the monopoly case examined
above coordination in information generation may increase welfare.
5 Extension: endogenous quality
In our model, information generation is the only way in which firms can
achieve vertical differentiation. A relevant question is therefore whether
and how the possibility of achieving vertical differentiation via other means
changes our results.
In this extension, we address this possibility by allowing firms to costlessly
degrade the quality of their product before generating information. A stan-
dard result in the literature (see, for example, Tirole, 1988) is that, absent
information generation, the quality follower will always degrade its quality
as much as possible in order to achieve maximum distance from the quality
leader. Quality degradation is observed in some instances,18 but is far from
ubiquitous. In this section we show that information generation may act as a
18For example, several producers of electronic devices are known to intentionally reduce
the performance and functionality of their products; e.g. the case of IBM printers.
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strategic substitute to quality degradation, and therefore explain why qual-
ity degradation is rarely observed. This also implies that, when quality is
endogenous, information generation has an additional social benefit because
it may prevent harmful quality degradation.
Denote by q0i ∈ [s, s] firm i’s initial quality with the convention that
q01 > q
0
2. Before the market opens, both firms simultaneously can decrease
their expected quality at zero cost to any qi ∈ [s, q0i ].19 Quality degradation
is publicly observable. Recall that firms’ profits increase in the distance
between their expected quality levels. Hence, absent information generation,
in the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a quality degradation game the
quality leader will maintain the initial quality q1 = q
0
1, but the follower will
degrade as much as possible to q2 = s.
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Turn now to a quality degradation and information generation game: af-
ter deciding whether to degrade its quality each firm can acquire information
at a cost k. Introducing information generation may affect the choice quality
degradation, because information generation provides an alternative means
to increase the quality distance between firms. However, in contrast to degra-
dation, information generation allows for upward revisions of the expected
quality as well as downward revisions, increasing the expected highest quality
and thus aggregate surplus.
Given that at least one firm generates information, the quality follower’s
profit can be written as:
E[π2(q̂1, q̂2)|σ] =
(




∆(σ, q1, q2) + π2(q1, q2). (9)
19More precisely, firm i can shift downward the quality distribution Fi(s) to achieve any
expected quality qi ∈ [s, q0i ]. As discussed above the “consumption utility” generated by
consuming a product si is unknown, but the product’s technical specifications are publicly
known and determine the expectation of si. With this interpretation in mind, quality
degradation can be achieved by designing a product with worse technical specifications.
20The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the quality follower degrades always
exists. A second pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in which the quality leader fully degrades
its quality, but the quality follower does not, exists for some q01 , q
0
2 . In case both equilibria
exist, they can be ranked in terms of efficiency, because the welfare loss is smaller when the
quality follower degrades than when the quality leader degrades. For ease of exposition,
we only discuss the Nash equilibrium in which the quality follower degrades.
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Note that π2(q1, q2) decreases in q2, but ∆(σ, q1, q2) increases in q2, and strictly
so if ∆(σ, q1, q2) > 0. Hence, if ∆(σ, q1, q2) = 0 and information generation
has no value, the above result carries over and the quality follower is better
off by degrading as much as possible to maximize the distance to the quality
leader. When ∆(σ, q1, q2) > 0, however, it is possible that E[π2(q̂1, q̂2)|σ]
increases in q2, and hence that there is no incentive to degrade quality. That
is, quality degradation and information generation can be alternative ways
to achieve vertical differentiation.





is arbitrarily close to zero whenever X∗ is close to θ, because in this case the
demand for the good sold by the quality follower is arbitrarily small. It is
also arbitrarily close to zero if q01 is close to s, because the maximum distance
that can be achieved between quality leader and follower is also arbitrarily
small. In either of these cases, we have that
E[π2(q̂1, q̂2)|σ] ≈
(





so that the quality follower’s profit is strictly positive and strictly increases in








2 are sufficiently close
or if σ is sufficiently informative (in the sense of dispersion in the posterior
expected qualities). This observation implies the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any X∗, there are q01, q
0
2 such that the quality follower will
fully degrade quality if no information is generated, but neither firm will
degrade quality if information is generated by at least one firm.
The lemma states that information generation can prevent harmful qual-
ity degradation. Indeed, a sufficiently low cost k will guarantee some infor-
mation generation in equilibrium, which implies the following corollary.
Corollary 5. There are q01, q
0
2 and k such that information generation and
no quality degradation constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
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quality degradation and information generation game.
Note that, if the case described in Lemma 5 and the following corollary
do not apply, the quality follower may partially degrade, even though infor-
mation is generated in equilibrium. For example, if the signals σ1 and σ2 are
discrete, then the probability of a quality ranking reversal may be discontin-
uous in the amount of quality degradation by the quality follower. That is,
this probability may be very small when the quality follower degrades by a
small amount, but jump discontinuously if the amount of quality degrada-
tion passes a given threshold. If, at the same time, the benefit of increasing
vertical distance is large, the quality follower may prefer to partially degrade
quality. We will not consider this possibility here.
Turning to social welfare, assume the case described in Lemma 5, i.e.
information generation prevents quality degradation. The social benefit is:
E[S(q̂1, q̂2)]−S(q01, s) = E[S(q̂1, q̂2)]−S(q01, q02)+S(q01, q02)−S(q01, s)
= (E[θ]−2F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]) ∆((∅, σi), q01, q02)+(q02−s)F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗].
(10)
The first term of this expression is the benefit of information generation given
initial quality levels. The second term stems from (5) and is the benefit from
preventing quality degradation. It increases in q02 − s (the amount of quality
degradation prevented by generating information), in the market share of
the quality follower and in the average valuation of these consumers. The
following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 6. There are q01, q
0
2 and k such that the social benefit of infor-
mation generation with endogenous quality is strictly greater than the one
with exogenous qualities.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5, (10) and the following discussion.
Since information generation can have an additional social benefit when
quality is endogenous rather than exogenous, Proposition 5 may no longer
apply. That is, when quality is exogenous, potentially the efficient number
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of signals is zero, but in equilibrium at least one firm generates information.
Under endogenous quality choice the fact that a firm is expected to generate
information prevents quality degradation. If the social benefit of preventing
quality degradation (given by the second part of 10) is larger than the net
social cost of an additional signal (given by the second part of 10 minus k),
then one firm generating information is the socially optimal outcome with
endogenous quality levels. Similarly, with exogenous quality levels there are
situations in which the efficient number of signals is zero, which is also the
equilibrium outcome. With endogenous quality levels, however, the absence
of information generation leads to quality degradation and may, therefore,
be inefficient. The following corollary summarizes these observations.
Corollary 6. Suppose the case described in Lemma 5 holds. There are cases
in which there is over-investment in information generation with exogenous
quality, but the efficient level of information generation when quality levels
are endogenous. Similarly, there are cases in which there is the efficient level
of information generation with exogenous quality, but under-investment in
information generation when quality levels are endogenous.
6 Conclusion
We consider a standard duopoly with vertically differentiated products, and
study firms’ incentives to generate information. Our main result is that firms
will under- or overinvest in information generation, depending on the ineffi-
ciencies in the pricing equilibrium. Taste distributions that generate a low
deadweight loss in the pricing equilibrium are associated with underprovision
of information. Conversely, taste distributions that generate a large dead-
weight loss are associated with overprovision of information. We also show
that information generation has a positive externality on the other firm’s
profit and thus firms benefit from coordinating their information generation
activities. Finally, we introduce the possibility of quality degradation and
show that quality degradation and information generation are substitutes
for increasing vertical product differentiation. Therefore the possibility of
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information generation may reduce harmful quality degradation.
This last result implies that there are situations in which information
generation should be discouraged if quality levels are exogenous—possibly
via a tax—but information generation should be encouraged if quality levels
are endogenous—possibly via a subsidy. This insight carries over to whether
cooperation and coordination of competing firms is allowed. There are situ-
ations in which coordination in information generation should be prevented
if quality levels are exogenous, but should be allowed or even encouraged if
quality levels are endogenous. This, however, implies that the optimal policy
may be time inconsistent, because the policymaker may want to revise the
policy after quality levels are set; this is an intriguing question for future
research.
Our analysis assumed a covered market: in equilibrium all consumers
purchase some product. Removing our Assumption 2 would potentially al-
low for equilibria in which some consumers do not purchase at all. If firms’
quality levels are sufficiently close, however, their profits are close to zero and
the market is covered. The logic laid out above continues to apply: informa-
tion generation by firms is privately valuable, because it increases expected
vertical distance and profits. From the social point of view, information gen-
eration may cause some consumers to stop consuming, which generates an
additional source of inefficiency relative to the case of a covered market con-
sidered above. If the initial quality distance between firms is large, so that
not all consumers purchase, our results may no longer apply: e.g. firms’ ben-
efits from information generation may become negative. A thorough analysis
of this case is deferred to future work.
Finally as a natural extension, one could combine Board (2009)’s frame-
work (which we discuss in the Introduction) with ours, that is, consider a
model in which firms first generate information and then decide whether to
make it public. Although we do not develop such extension here, an insight
from our model can nonetheless be helpful. We show that a firm’s profits
increase with the informativeness of the signal drawn (or with the number of
signals drawn). This implies that if a firm could commit to a policy of full
disclosure, it will strictly prefer to do so because the possibility to hide some
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realizations of the signal effectively reduces the informativeness of the signal
(from the consumers’ viewpoint). We also note that some of the mechanism
for information generation discussed earlier have this element of commitment
(for example, industry competition or classifications by industry bodies).
This full disclosure policy makes the equilibrium of such model identical to
the equilibrium in ours. Of course, absent this commitment, the intuition
from Board (2009) will be relevant: firms may hide intermediate realizations
of the signal so to be considered “bad” and increase vertical differentiation.
This in turn reduces the value of information generation. Exploring how
this affects the choice of information generation, and the efficiency of the
equilibrium, is left for future work.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Note first that X = Y = θ quickly leads to a contradiction: if both prices
are so high that no consumers purchase, then each one of the firms will earn
strictly positive payoff by deviating to a small, but positive price, which
will attract a positive measure of consumers because F (θ) is continuous and
θ > 0.
Suppose that X = θ, i.e. the quality leader faces zero demand. Then, by
the argument above, Y < θ and the quality follower faces positive demand.
This cannot be an equilibrium because the quality leader can set its price
equal that of the quality follower, generate positive demand and earn positive
profits.
Finally, suppose that θ < X < θ, i.e. the quality leader faces positive
demand, but does not capture the entire market. Then Y < X. To see this
suppose the contrary, i.e. Y = X. This cannot be an equilibrium because
the quality follower will earn strictly positive profits by setting a small, but
positive price, which will attract a positive measure of consumers because
F (θ) is continuous and θ > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 2
The best responses are defined as:
pL(pF ) = argmaxpL {πL(pL, pF )}
pF (pL) = argmaxpF {πF (pL, pF )} .
We first compute the leader’s best response and then move to the follower’s
best response. As we will see, computing the leader’s best response is quite
straightforward, while computing the follower’s best response is complicated
by a kink in the profit function.
Quality leader’s best response. Consider first the quality leader’s prob-
lem. For given pF the leader can out-price the follower and set pL ≤ θ(q̂L −
q̂F ) + pF , so that X = θ. In this case the leader serves the entire market and
its profit equals pL. Hence, conditional on X = θ the quality leader maxi-
mizes profits by setting pL = θ(q̂L− q̂F )+pF . If instead pL > θ(q̂L− q̂F )+pF ,
the leader serves only a fraction of the total market, and X > Y ≥ θ. Using












The first derivative of the objective function is













(q̂L − q̂F ), (11)
which is unique due to log-concavity. Log-concavity also implies that the








(q̂L − q̂F ) and strictly decreases for pL > 1−F (X)f(X) (q̂L − q̂F ).
Quality follower’s best response. We now turn to the quality follower
F ’s best response. We first deal with the trivial case where the leader corners
the market. Suppose the quality leader chooses pL ≤ θ(q̂L − q̂F ). Then, for
any pF , the quality leader covers the entire market and the quality follower’s
profit is zero for any pL. Thus the quality follower’s best response is
pF (pL) = [0,∞) if pL ≤ θ(q̂L − q̂F ).
This establishes the first part of pF (pL) in the lemma.
Suppose now that pL > θ(q̂L − q̂F ) instead. Then there are pF > 0 such
that the follower has positive demand and profit. Note that the follower’s
profit function has a kink at price pF = θq̂F , but is well-behaved above and
below, which allows us to characterize the follower’s best response distin-
guishing the cases of pF ≤ θq̂F (in which case Y = θ and the market is
covered) and pF > θq̂F (in which case Y > θ and the market is not covered).
Covered market. If pF ≤ θq̂F , then all consumers purchase one of the
goods and Y = θ, so that a change in pF only affects X. Conditional on











The first derivative equals zero at pF =
F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F ), which is unique by
log-concavity. Again, conditional on Y = θ, the follower’s profit function is
strictly concave at pF =
F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F ), which in turns imply that profits
conditional on Y = θ are first increasing then decreasing in pF , reaching a
maximum at pF =
F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F ).
Non-covered market. If instead pF > θq̂F some consumers will not pur-
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chase, so that a change in pF will affect both X and Y . Conditional on
θ ≤ Y < X, the follower’s profit function is now
max
pF≥θq̂F
{pF (F (X)− F (Y ))} .
The objective function’s first derivative is









Now Condition (A2) becomes useful: it implies that the above expression is
always negative, which implies that the quality follower always sets a price
so that Y = θ and the market is covered.
To see why, note that 11 implies that X < 1−F (X)
f(X)
so that X ≤ θ∗. Hence,
by the definition of m (see Assumption 2) f(X) < m and f(Y ) < m. Recall
that the first order condition for the case Y > θ is




















which is negative under (A2). Hence the first order condition for the case
Y > θ is always negative, and the quality follower is always better off by
setting pF such that Y = θ.
Hence, pF > θq̂F cannot occur, implying the second part of pF (pL) in the
lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 1



















We prove each part of the proposition separately.
(i) Recall the quality leader’s best reply as derived above:




(q̂L − q̂F ), θ(q̂L − q̂F ) + pF
}
.
By log-concavity 1−F (X)
f(X)





(q̂L − q̂F ) + pF ≥ 0
the quality leader’s captures the entire market. If pF > 0, this cannot be
an equilibrium because the quality follower should lower its price and earn
positive profits. If instead pF = 0 and pL = θ(q̂L − q̂F ) then no firm can
make a profitable deviation, and these prices constitute a Nash equilibrium.
If θf(θ) ≥ 1, therefore, in equilibrium the leader captures the entire market.
(ii) Suppose instead 1 > θf(θ) from now on. The observations made
in the text above imply that in this case the quality leader’s best reply to
pF = 0 is pL =
1−F (pL/(q̂L−q̂F ))
f(pL/(q̂L−q̂F ))
(q̂L − q̂F ). Hence, by Lemma 1 the Nash





(q̂L − q̂F ), θq̂F
}
> 0. Therefore there are two possible cases, de-
pending on whether the quality follower’s best response is a corner solution
(pF = θq̂F ) or an interior solution (pF =
F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F )).




(q̂L − q̂F ) ≤ θq̂F , (13)
36
so that pF =
F (X)
f(X)






This equation has a unique solution because, by log concavity, its RHS is
decreasing in X and we have assumed 1 > θf(θ). This constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if indeed the solution X of equation (14) satisfies condition (13).











is at most s
s






































where the last inequality follows by (12). Hence, (13) holds and thus pF =
F (X)
f(X)
(q̂L − q̂F ) and pL = 1−F (X)f(X) (q̂L − q̂F ), with X defined implicitly by (14)
is a Nash equilibrium.
To conclude the proof, we show that there is no equilibrium in which 1 >




(q̂L − q̂F ),
but at the same time (13) is violated, and hence the quality follower’s best
response has a corner solution:
pF = θq̂F .
21Here we make use again of a fact established in the proof of Lemma 2 (see its last
paragraph): that f(X) ≥ m.
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This is consistent with a Nash equilibrium if indeed for this X (13) is violated.
Note that by (15) F (X)
f(X)
is smaller than 1
f(X)
−X which, in turn, is smaller
than 1
m
− θ. Also, q̂L−q̂F
q̂F
























where the last inequality follows by (12). Hence, (13) must hold and there
cannot be a Nash equilibrium with pF = θq̂F .
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that no firm acquires information; then q̂i = qi for i = 1, 2 and
(by assumption) firm 1 is the quality leader. The ex ante expected social
welfare is then S(q1, q2) = E[θ] q1 = E[θ]E[q̂1|σ], where the last equality
follows from the law of iterated expectation and holds for any σ. The social
benefit of acquiring information is therefore given by the difference between
expected social welfare given a chosen signal configuration σ and expected
social welfare when no information is acquired:
E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ]−S(q1, q2) = E[θ]E[max{q̂1, q̂2}|σ]− E[θ]E[q̂1|σ]
=E[θ]{E[q̂1|q̂1≥ q̂2, σ]pr{q̂1≥ q̂2|σ}+ E[q̂2|q̂2≥ q̂1, σ]pr{q̂2≥ q̂1|σ}
−E[q̂1|q̂1≥ q̂2, σ]pr{q̂1≥ q̂2|σ} − E[q̂1|q̂2≥ q̂1, σ]pr{q̂2≥ q̂1|σ}}
=E[θ]E[q̂2 − q̂1|q̂2 ≥ q̂1, σ]pr{q̂2 ≥ q̂1|σ} ≡ E[θ] ∆(σ, q1, q2).
The proposition follows by writing
E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′′]−E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′] = (E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′′]− S(q1, q2))+(S(q1, q2)− E[S(q̂1, q̂2)|σ′])
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Proof of Proposition 3
We distinguish three cases:
1. It is socially optimal to generate no information, that is
2k > E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2) and k > E[θ]∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) i ∈ {1, 2}.
By Proposition 2 each firm’s best reply to the other firm not generating
information is to not generate information either. Likewise, each firm
i’s best reply to the other firm −i generating information is not to
generate information, if
k ≥ θ (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2)) ,
which is always true, because
θ(∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2))
≤ E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≤ 2k−θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≤ k.
Hence, in the case when no information generation is socially optimal
there is a unique Nash equilibrium, in which neither firm generates any
information.
2. It is socially optimal for firm i to generate information, but not firm
−i, that is
E[θ]∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2) ≤ E[θ]∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≡ k̂1 and
k̂4≡E[θ](∆((σ1, σ2)q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2))<k<E[θ]∆((∅, σi), q1, q2).
(16)
The second inequality immediately implies
k > θ [∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)] .
This means that if firm i generates information, then firm −i’s best re-
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ply is to not generate information. Hence, there is no Nash equilibrium,
in which both firms generate information.
Suppose that
k > θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≡ k̂0. (17)
Then neither firm finds it profitable to generate information if the other
firm does not. Hence, in the unique Nash equilibrium there is no infor-
mation generation.
If instead
θ∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2) < k ≤ θ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2),
then there is a unique equilibrium in which firm i generates information.
Finally, if
k ≤ θ∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2) ≡ k̂5,
then there are multiple equilibria, in which each firm may generate
information, while the other one does not. In one of these equilibria
firm −i generates information, but not firm i. This is inefficient, be-
cause by assumption ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) < ∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2), i.e. firm i’s
signal generates more information (as measured by the dispersion of
the posteriors) and higher social welfare than firm −i’s signal.
3. It is socially optimal for both firms to generate information, that is
2k ≤ E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2) and
E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−2k≥E[θ]max{∆((∅, σ1), q1, q2),∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)}−k.
That is, the net social benefit of drawing both signals is positive, and
exceeds the net social benefit of drawing either individual signal. The
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above inequalities can be rewritten as





∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2),∆((∅, σ1), q1, q2),∆((∅, σ2), q1, q2)
})
≡ k̂3.
A necessary condition for both firms to generate information in a Nash
equilibrium (including the case of multiple equilibria) is
k < θ (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) ,
for both firms i = 1, 2, or
k ≤ θ (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−max {∆((∅, σ1), q1, q2),∆((∅, σ2), q1, q2)}) ≡ k̂2.
Therefore, if
k > k̂2 and k ≤ k̂3, (18)
then the number of signals drawn in a Nash equilibrium is strictly
less than in the social optimum. Otherwise, there will be a (possibly
unique) Nash equilibrium that is efficient.
We therefore established that the number of signals drawn in equilibrium
is always smaller than the socially optimal number of signals, strictly so if
either both conditions (16) and (17) hold, or both conditions in (18) hold.
Note also that, in both cases, the set of such k for which fewer signals than
optimal are drawn expands with E[θ]−θ and with the first difference of ∆(.).
We also established the possibility of a coordination failure: when the
efficient number of signals is 1, either firm generating one signal may be a
Nash equilibrium, and in particular only the firm with the less informative
signal generating information may be an equilibrium, which is inefficient.
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Proof of Lemma 4
Simply note that social welfare can be written as
S(q̂1, q̂2) = max{q̂1, q̂2}E[θ]− |q̂1 − q̂2|F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]
= max{q̂1, q̂2}E[θ]− (2 max{q̂1, q̂2} − q̂1 − q̂2)F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]
= max{q̂1, q̂2} (E[θ]− 2F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗]) + (q̂1 + q̂2)F (X∗)E[θ|θ<X∗].
The statement follows from the same derivations detailed in the proof of
Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 4




pr{q̂i ≥ q̂−i|σ}E[q̂i − q̂−i|q̂i ≥ q̂−i, σ′′] +
F (X∗)2
f(X∗)
pr{q̂−i ≥ q̂i|σ}E[q̂−i − q̂i|q̂−i ≥ q̂i, σ]
Suppose q̂i ≥ q̂−i. By using the law of iterated expectation, write






(pr{q̂i ≥ q̂−i|σ}E[q̂i − q̂−i|q̂i ≥ q̂−i, σ] + pr{q̂−i ≥ q̂i|σ}E[q̂i − q̂−i|q̂−i ≥ q̂i, σ])
Similarly, if q̂i ≤ q̂−i write






(pr{q̂i ≥ q̂−i|σ}E[q̂i − q̂−i|q̂i ≥ q̂−i, σ] + pr{q̂−i ≥ q̂i|σ}E[q̂i − q̂−i|q̂−i ≥ q̂i, σ])
Both when q̂i ≥ q̂−i and when q̂i ≤ q̂−i we can then write









E[πi(q̂i, q̂−i)|σ′′]− E[πi(q̂i, q̂−i)|σ′] =





(∆(σ′′, q1, q2)−∆(σ′, q1, q2)) ,
Concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
The pure strategy Nash equilibria of the information generation game for the
case of a duopoly are similar to the ones derived for the case of a monopoly,
modulo the different expression for the private benefit of information gener-
ation. We have:
• If k >
(




(∆(σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) and(




∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≥ k for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, then
there is an equilibrium in which only firm i generates information.
• if k ≤
(




(∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2))
and
(




∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≥ k for at least one i ∈ {1, 2},
then there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms generate infor-
mation.
• if k ≤
(




(∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)),
but
(




∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≤ k for both i = 1, 2, then there
are multiple equilibria: one in which no firm generates information,
and one in which both firms generate information.
• Otherwise there is no information generation in equilibrium.
We follow the structure of the proof of Proposition 3 and consider differ-
ent cases. For ease of notation let us define the social value of information
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generation as
S ·∆(σ, q1, q2) ≡ (E[θ]− 2F (X∗)E[θ|θ < X∗]) ∆(σ, q1, q2),
and the private value of information generation as







Condition (8) implies that P > S, so that the private benefit of information
generation is higher than the social benefit. We distinguish three cases.
1. It is socially optimal to have no information generation, that is
k > S∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) and 2k > S∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2).
At least one firm i will invest if k < P∆((∅, σi), q1, q2), and thus the
number of signals generated in equilibrium is higher than socially op-
timal if
k̂0 ≡ Smax{∆((∅, σi), q1, q2),∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)} < k
< P∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) ≡ k̂1.
Otherwise, if the above condition does not hold, there may be an equi-
librium, in which both firms invest, if
k ≤ P (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.
In this case there are, however, multiple equilibria: one with both firms
investing and one with neither firm investing.
2. It is socially optimal for firm i to generate information but not firm −i,
that is
S (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) < k < S∆((∅, σi), q1, q2) and
∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2) < ∆((∅, σi), q1, q2).
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Note that this case can only occur if ∆(.) has strictly decreasing dif-
ferences in σ. Since P > S, at least one firm will invest in any Nash
equilibrium, so the number of signals is at least the socially optimal
one. For both firms to invest to be the unique Nash equilibrium it is
necessary that
k < P (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) and k < P∆((∅, σi), q1, q2),
Since S < P the second condition holds. Hence, both firms will invest
and there will be overinvestment if
k̂2 ≡ S (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) < k
< P (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) ≡ k̂3.
If the above condition is violated, but
k̂4 ≡ P (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) < k < P∆((∅, σ−i), q1, q2) ≡ k̂5,
then in equilibrium only one firm invests. If firm i invests then the
equilibrium is efficient. If firm −i invests, then the equilibrium is in-
efficient. In this last case, in equilibrium the information generated in
equilibrium is less then the social optimum, because the firm with the
least informative signal generates information in equilibrium.
3. It is socially optimal for both firms to generate information, that is
2k < E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2) and
E[θ]∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−2k>E[θ]max{∆((∅, σ1), q1, q2),∆((∅, σ2), q1, q2)}−k.
A necessary and sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium, in which
both firms generate information, is:
k < P (∆((σ1, σ2), q1, q2)−∆((∅, σi), q1, q2)) ,
for both firms i = 1, 2. Because P > S, there is always an equilibrium
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in which both firms generate information. Of course, there may also
be another equilibrium, in which no firm generates information. But,
as discussed in the text, when both equilibria are present the one in
which both firms generate information Pareto dominates the other.
By restricting our attention to equilibria that are not Pareto dominated,
we established that the number of signals drawn in equilibrium is always
above the efficient one, strictly so in some cases. Also here, there is the
possibility that the efficient number of signals is one, which is also the equi-
librium one, but the “wrong” firm generates information in equilibrium.
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